Trump hits the brakes in Lebanon and Israel will have to give diplomacy a chance

 After U.S. President Donald Trump reprimanded Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in response to the military operation in the town of Beit Jinn in the Syrian Golan Heights and his order, "It is very important that Israel maintain a strong and true dialogue with Syria, and that nothing takes place that will interfere with Syria's evolution into a prosperous State," America flexed its muscles on the Lebanese front on Wednesday.

The appointment of National Security Adviser representative Uri Resnick to head the Israeli delegation on the cease-fire implementation monitoring committee, paralleling the appointment of veteran Lebanese diplomat Simon Karam to head the Lebanese delegation, marks a diplomatic breakthrough that may slow or even stop the race to a military clash between the two countries.

As far as Lebanon is concerned, this is an important political step, as so far the Lebanese leadership, headed by President Joseph Aoun, has refused to grant the monitoring committee ("the mechanism") even a remote semblance of a structure for conducting political negotiations that could be interpreted as the beginning of a journey toward normalization with Israel.

Aoun, although talking about the need for negotiations with Israel in recent weeks as a path for security arrangements, avoided uttering the words "direct negotiations."

Even now, after Karam's appointment, Prime Minister Nawaf Salam emphasized, "These are not peace talks. Any normalization will be linked to a comprehensive peace process that is far from being realized." He added, however, "There is willingness for supra-military negotiations." He did not say whether Lebanon would be willing for limited diplomatic negotiations or economic agreements, as Netanyahu hinted at, but it's important to note Karam's remarks last July in this context.

At a conference at Al-Quds University, the 75-year-old diplomat, one of Hezbollah's most vocal opponents, accused, "Those who agreed to a cease-fire with Israel [meaning Hezbollah] are shooting heavy political and security fire at Lebanon's domestic arena. They are attacking the country that adopted the diplomatic option, which is the only possible option after the Nakba. They attacked the army for not being able to defend the country and its people and the international forces, because they are making an effort to implement UN resolutions. They are all traitors and conspirators ... The diplomatic option means accepting negotiations in the shadow of the current balance of power and is the only possible path facing the country."

Lebanon's consent to enter into negotiations on diplomatic and not just military issues was taken after the threat of war expansion was perceived as a real and present danger, accompanied by heavy American political pressure on Lebanon, and against which Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Qatar, pressured Washington to calm Israel down.

The American pressure began several weeks ago, when the previous American envoy, Thomas Barrack, made it clear to the Lebanese leadership that "America is not going to get deeper involved in the situation with a foreign terrorist organization [Hezbollah] and a failed state [Lebanon] dictating the pace and asking for more resources and more money and more help." That remark was interpreted as giving Israel a free hand to act militarily as it deemed fit. Furthermore, in an interview with Haaretz correspondent Liza Rozovsky, U.S. Ambassador Michel Issa said, "Israel does not need U.S. approval to defend itself."

But Barrack, whose remarks are difficult to accuse of being overly consistent, also said, "If you [Lebanon] want to do that, we'll help. We'll put pressure on Israel to be reasonable." Now perhaps the Americans will come up with an interpretation of the term "reasonable", under which Israel may be required to hold its fire so long as the negotiations are in progress and also to seriously discuss the stages of withdrawal from the five points it controls in Lebanese territory and demarcating the border, a move that would require parallel negotiations with Syria, which claims ownership of the Shebaa Farms, the most explosive bone of contention in the demarcation.

Israel's conduct in the coming days will demonstrate whether it agrees to withdraw the principle of holding negotiations only under fire, while Lebanon will be required to demonstrate its determination on the ground and ability to clear southern Lebanon of Hezbollah's arms and installations. As for disarmament in northern Lebanon, that move will likely take longer as President Aoun and Prime Minister Salam try to reach agreements with Hezbollah.

In this context, Salam's statement, "Indirect negotiations [with Israel] are being held under a clear national umbrella. This step is politically fortified and enjoys domestic consensus." The public, political and media dialogue in Lebanon indeed mostly supports the measure that the government resolved on, but it was important to Salam to say it "aloud" to be heard not only in Dahiya but also in Tehran.

Hezbollah, which is still insisting on not disarming, left the issue in the negotiations ambiguous, and its secretary general, Naim Qassem, did not mention it at all in his public letter to Lebanon's three leaders, Aoun, Salam and Speaker of the Parliament and Amal chairman Nabih Berri in October, in which he listed the organization's demands.

But the test of Hezbollah's conduct, after it previously approved the maritime border demarcation agreement with Israel, will not be over its agreement or objection to the fact of the diplomatic negotiations. That will come when the Lebanese army starts systematically disarming it in northern Lebanon and the Beqaa. Ahead of that stage, the U.S. is expected to equip the Lebanese government with diplomatic and political ammunition that will facilitate its reaching arrangements with Hezbollah or mobilizing public legitimacy should it become necessary to confront them.

Israel is also expected to provide Lebanon with diplomatic achievements, such as withdrawing from the five outposts it holds within Lebanon, returning the Lebanese prisoners it holds, and allowing the return of thousands of Lebanese, mostly Shias, who fled their villages in southern Lebanon and have not yet returned home. That measure is also critical for enabling the Lebanese army to deploy along the border as prescribed in the cease-fire, thus completing the establishment of the government's sovereignty in an area that has been outside its control for decades. It has additional importance in relation to the political and economic struggle for Lebanon's reconstruction.

Hezbollah is committed to compensating the residents of Dahiya and southern Lebanon for the damage they suffered during the war ,and it has transferred funds to some of the displaced persons for rent and buying furniture and basic supplies. Some of that money came from Iran.

As the negotiations between Israel and Lebanon progress and the cease-fire turns into stability, the Lebanese reconstruction campaign may develop into a political struggle between Hezbollah and the Lebanese government, especially when, in six months, parliamentary elections are due to be held. These elections, the first after the war, will likely be decisive in terms of Hezbollah's public and political standing both against its political rivals and against its partner Nabih Berri, its rival for representing the Shia community.

Hence, the great importance of government control over the reconstruction project in a way that will deprive Hezbollah of the levers of influence over the population in the south and, from there, over Lebanon's political arena as a whole.

Precisely because Israel is worried about Hezbollah's activity rightly complains that the Lebanese government is powerless, and it must examine Lebanon's domestic political struggles as part of its security approach towards the country. It must weigh the extent of the benefit it derives from its continued hold on the five sites in Lebanon against the harm that that hold causes to the Lebanese government's ability to leverage the reconstruction of the south as a way to erode Hezbollah's power.